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DEVELOPING IMMUNITY: THE CHALLENGES
IN MANDATING VACCINATIONS IN THE WAKE
OF A BIOLOGICAL TERRORIST ATTACK
Lea Ann Fracasso
INTRODUCTION
A man enters an emergency room in Chicago, Illinois. The patient
presents with fever, headache, nausea, and muscle aches. He is assumed to
have the seasonal flu and is sent home with instructions to take ibuprofen
for his fever and to drink fluids until the fever breaks. Although he spends
most of his time at home, he does carry on with his regular errands during
the day. He visits the bank, the grocery store, his children's school, the
dry cleaner, and his favorite coffee shop. After three days, he notices small
red bumps on his tongue and inside his mouth. By the next day the bumps
have become aggravated and break open.' The rash spreads to his arms
and legs. He returns to the emergency room. Because the patient is not in
immediate danger he waits approximately four hours in the hospital wait-
ing room. When the doctor finally sees him, his ailment is no longer a
mystery, but the source of it is. The man has smallpox. He will be conta-
gious for approximately the next two weeks.
Once the doctor realizes that smallpox is present, the United States
response is set in motion. The CDC is contacted and further testing con-
firms the diagnosis. By now, calls from all over the Midwest are coming
in with reports of individuals with the same symptoms. One thing is clear
- this is not an accident. The last case of smallpox in the U.S. occurred in
1949 and the last in the world occurred in Somalia in 1977.2 Within days,
reports from New York, Toronto, Mexico City, London, Madrid, Dubai,
Mumbai, Sydney and Tokyo are also indicating the presence of smallpox.
Whether the disease has jumped the borders by infected persons or each
city represents an independent attack site is not clear. While governments
* Lea Ann Fracasso is a third year law student at DePaul University College of Law. She has a master of
humanities degree from Wright State University, has served in the Air Force and will be a J.D. candidate in
2010.
1 Center for Disease Control and Prevention, Smallpox Disease Overview, http://www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/
smallpox/overview/disease-facts.asp (last visited Nov. 19, 2009).
2 Id.
DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW
respond quickly to the news, they are operating at a disadvantage. They
are already approximately three weeks behind the beginning of the infec-
tion. The country's federal law enforcement personnel will begin looking
right away for a perpetrator because the most likely suspicion when con-
fronted with a case of smallpox is bioterrorism. The global presence of the
virus will necessarily involve the World Health Organization, which will
assist countries in their response to the disease.
The smallpox vaccine has been heralded as extremely effective when
administered before or within three days of exposure to the disease. Cur-
rent U.S. stockpiles reportedly can vaccinate the entire population, but that
may not be true for other countries.3  The first to be vaccinated will be
those who came in contact with the infected individual. The CDC priori-
tizes whom should be vaccinated next,4 including health care workers and
those who will investigate the attack and path of the disease. Those who
present with symptoms are to be located and isolated if possible to prevent
further spread of the disease. Various scholars put the potential death rate
at more than 100,000 deaths within a year.5 During the smallpox "era" the
mortality rate for unvaccinated individuals was around thirty percent.6
Death tolls in other countries may reach higher as developing nations
struggle to respond to the needs of an infected population.
The above is just a short example of the possible ramifications of a
sophisticated biological weapons attack. However, the scenario is well
within the realm of reality, given the recent global outbreak of HIN1 and
the global community's preparation and response to that disease. HIN1
was first detected in the U.S. in April 2009. On June 11, 2009, the World
Health Organization declared that a flu pandemic was underway.7 The
U.S. ordered 250 million doses of the 2009 HINI vaccine, but the vaccine
takes time to manufacture and was not readily available in large quantities.
This resulted in long lines of individuals waiting to be immunized, as de-
ployment of the vaccine was rife with problems.8 At the time of this writ-
3 Center for Disease Control and Prevention, Vaccine Overview, http://www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/smallpox/
vaccination/facts.asp (last visited Nov. 19, 2009).
4 Center for Disease Control and Prevention, Smallpox Response Plan and Guidelines, http://www.bt.cdc.
gov/agent/smallpox/response-plan/index.asp (last visited Nov. 19, 2009).
5 Edward H. Kaplan, David L. Craft, & Lawrence M. Wein, Emergency Response to a Smallpox Attack:
The Case for Mass Vaccination, 99 PROCEEDINGS NAT'L ACAD. SCI. 10935 (2002).
6 Center for Disease Control and Prevention, CDC Interim Guidance for Revaccination of Eligible Persons
who Participated in the U.S. Civilian Smallpox Preparedness and Response Program,
http://www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/smallpox/revaxmemo.asp (last visited Nov. 19, 2009).
7 World Health Organization, Pandemic (HIN1) 2009 - Update 75, http://www.who.int/csr/don/2009 11
20alen/index.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2009).
8 Jackie Calmes & Donald G. McNeil Jr., H1NI Widespread in 46 States as Vaccines Lag, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 24, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/25/us/politics/25flu.html.
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ing more than 206 countries have detected cases of HINI resulting in
6,750 deaths. 9 Around 60 million people have been vaccinated globally.
This Paper will discuss the necessary vaccination response to a terror-
ist smallpox attack. Part I will discuss pre and post-attack considerations
in the law of mandatory vaccinations. Part II discusses the pre and post-
attack considerations in governmental responses to biological diseases.
Part III discusses the liabilities of parties in a pre and post-attack scenar-
10s.
PART I - PRE AND POST-ATTACK CONSIDERATIONS
IN THE LAW OF MANDATORY VACCINATIONS
A. Immunization requirements Pre-Attack
The United States Supreme Court has consistently upheld a state's re-
quirement for immunizations.10 The state's interest in exercising its police
power pre-empts the individual's interest in remaining unvaccinated. Pub-
lic health officials are given broad discretion in regulating vaccinations
that protect civilian populations." Courts have declared themselves ill
suited to question the medical findings of a board of health, whose exper-
tise is essential to the execution of a state's police power. 12 The means by
which the state protects public health is within the discretion of the state so
long as it does not run afoul of any federally protected constitutional
right." A court will only involve itself in the manner in which the police
power is executed if it is done in an arbitrary and unreasonable manner.14
The Supreme Court has analyzed a state's power to require vaccina-
tions under the concept of the state's police power. In Jacobson v. Massa-
chusetts, a resident of Cambridge refused to be vaccinated against small-
pox in violation of a city ordinance requiring vaccination or forfeiture of
five dollars.1 5 A jury found Jacobson guilty of violating the statute and
sentenced him to pay the five-dollar fine. The U.S. Supreme Court, upon
review of the case, found no fault with the Massachusetts law requiring the
vaccinations of individuals against smallpox.16 To allow an individual to
9 World Health Organization, Pandemic (HINI) 2009 - Update 75, http://www.who.int/csr/don/2009 11
20a/en/index.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2009).
10 Jacobson v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905); Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174 (1922).
11 Zucht, 260 U.S. at 177.
12 Id. at 175.
13 Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 25.
14 Jacobson, 107 U.S. at 28; Zucht, 260 U.S. at 177.
15 Jacobson 197 U.S. at 11.
16 Id. at 38.
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refuse the vaccine without any evidence that a vaccination would necessar-
ily result in the individual's death, or even a detriment to the individual's
health, would allow the individual to put the health and safety of the entire
population of the state at risk. This was a risk the Court was unable to ac-
cept, stating
If such be the privilege of a minority, then a like privilege would be-
long to each individual of the community, and the spectacle would
be presented of the welfare and safety of an entire population being
subordinated to the notions of a single individual who chooses to
remain a part of that population.' 7
The Court also noted that vaccination requirements existed in Britain,
Denmark, Sweden, Prussia, Germany, Hungary, Switzerland, and Austra-
lia, evidencing that mandatory vaccination for smallpox has at least at one
time been required in other countries across the world.18
In Zucht v. King, Rosalyn Zucht was prevented from matriculating to
San Antonio, Texas city schools because she did not have a valid vaccina-
tion certificate and further refused to be vaccinated.19 The city also pre-
vented Rosalyn from attending private schools in the city. Aside from
finding that Rosalyn had not presented a valid federal claim, the Court
noted, "in the exercise of the police power reasonable classification may
be feely applied, and that regulation is not violative of the equal protection
clause merely because it is not all-embracing." 20 The Court found that the
ordinance in question was not arbitrary but was rather a proper exercise of
"that broad discretion required for protection of the public health." 21
B. Pre-attack Exemptions to Vaccinations
States have cited to the Jacobson and Zucht opinions to justify man-
datory vaccination programs and vaccination as a prerequisite to school
attendance.22 These decisions are usually attacked under three competing
theories: (1) parents' right to make decisions regarding their own children,
(2) the right of children to an education, and (3) religious or philosophical
aversions to vaccination. All three of these arguments have failed to con-
sistently persuade courts to allow for vaccination exemptions, although re-
ligious exemptions have gained ground due to statutory interpretation in
17 Id. at 37-38.
18 Id. at 32.
19 Zucht, 260 U.S. at 175.
20 Id. at 177.
21 Id.
22 See, e.g. Maricopa County Health Dept. v. Harmon, 750 P.2d 1364, 1369-70 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987);
Cude v. State, 377 S.W. 2d 816, 818 (Ark. 1964); Bd. of Educ. Of Mountain Lakes v. Maas, 152 A.2d 394,
403 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1959).
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some states. Medical exemptions alone remain a consistent barrier to vac-
cination.
1. Parents' Right to Make Decisions Regarding Their Children
In the United Sates, parents' choices regarding the raising of their
children are protected under the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amend-
ment to the Constitution and the Supreme Court's interpretation of that
clause. Under the clause, raising children is considered a fundamental
right, and therefore a state's attempt to interfere with that right will be
evaluated using the strictest scrutiny. Legislation that interferes with the
right must be necessary to achieve the state's goal, which must be compel-
ling. In Troxel v. Granville, a Washington court ordered the visitation of
grandparents over the surviving parent's objection.23 In reversing the
lower court and allowing the parent to deny the visitation, the Supreme
Court held that
so long as a parent adequately cares for his or her children (i.e., is
fit), there will normally be no reason for the State to inject itself into
the private realm of the family to further question the ability of that
parent to make the best decisions concerning the rearing of that par-
ent's children. 24
This case follows a long line of cases finding in favor of the parent.25
However, the Troxel opinion left open the possibility that if parents
were unfit, then their decisions regarding their children would not be up-
held.26 This was also accounted for in the Jacobson case, where the only
exemptions allowed in the statute were upon the recommendation of a cer-
tified physician that a child was not well enough to receive the vaccine.
The power of a parent to prevent state intervention is not limitless. In
Prince v. Massachusetts, the Court examined a violation of Massachusetts'
child labor law.27 Prince, a Jehovah's Witness, was aunt and guardian to a
nine-year-old girl whom Prince allowed to distribute the religion's maga-
zines on the streets of Brockton, Massachusetts. 28 Noting the general ac-
23 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
24 Id. at 68-69.
25 See, e.g. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (finding compulsory public school attendance statute
in violation of the Free Exercise Clause as to Amish and Mennonite which prohibited school beyond the
eighth grade); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (striking down a law requiring children to
attend public school when the parents wished to send their children to private schools); Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390 (1923) (striking down a Nebraska statute that prohibited the teaching of foreign languages to
children); West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnett, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (holding that a school
board could not expel students who did not salute the flag when doing so violated the instructions of their
parents regarding their religion).
26 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 69.
27 Prince v. Mass., 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
28 Id. at 161.
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quiescence to a parent's choices, the Court detailed the roll of the state in
child development, stating, "[a]cting to guard the general interest in
youth's well being, the state as parens patriae may restrict the parent's
control by requiring school attendance, regulating or prohibiting the child's
labor and in many other ways." 29 A state may more readily proscribe the
conduct of children than that of adults. "Parents may be free to become
martyrs themselves," stated the Court, "but it does not follow they are free,
in identical circumstances, to make martyrs of their children." 30 There is
no question that such an analysis will allow for overriding parental objec-
tions to mandatory vaccinations. The Court in Prince expressly stated,
"The right to practice religion freely does not include liberty to expose the
community or the child to communicable disease or the latter to ill health
or death." 31
2. Fundamental Right to an Education
In order to ensure the vaccination of children, states have found it
easiest to mandate vaccination as a prerequisite for school enrollment. As
of 1999, every state has done so, requiring that parents vaccinate children
against the most common childhood diseases including measles, rubella
and polio, among others.32 If parents were to claim that such requirements
restrict their children's access to education, such a claim would fail on the
basis that the child's interest in education is not protected to the extent
necessary to override a state's decision affecting public health.
In San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, parents of
students in the school district brought suit claiming that the method of
funding schools in Texas from property taxes created substantial inter-
district disparities in per-pupil expenditures. 33 The Supreme Court held
that access to education is not a fundamental right under the federal Con-
stitution, stating that where wealth was involved equal protection did not
require absolute equality or precisely equal advantages. 34 In refusing to
extend the full power of the Equal Protection Clause to school attendance,
the Court stated, "the undisputed importance of education will not alone
cause this Court to depart from the usual standard for reviewing a State's
social and economic legislation." Some state courts have examined this
29 Id. at 166.
30 Id. at 170.
31 Id. at 166-67.
32 Anthony Ciolli, Religious & Philosophical Exemptions to Mandatory School Vaccinations: Who Should
Bear the Costs to Society?, 74 Mo. L. REv. 287, 287 (2009).
33 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
34 Id. at 24.
35 Id. at 35.
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issue and decided differently from the United States Supreme Court, in-
cluding the courts of Vermont and West Virginia. However, both of those
states still continue to exclude children from school based on immuniza-
tion requirements.
3. Pre-Attack Religious and Philosophical Exemptions
While neither parental rights, nor the importance of education will
enable a parent to get around mandatory vaccinations laws, every state
currently exempts certain individuals from the requirements of compulsory
vaccination. Forty-eight states allow for exemptions to requirements
based on religious objections. West Virginia and Mississippi do not allow
for religious exemptions of any kind.36 Moreover, fourteen states recog-
nize philosophical exemptions to vaccinations.
While some states allow authorities to probe the parent's beliefs in
order to ensure sincerity, other states require no showing at all that the
parents or their purported religion truly hold the belief.37 For example, the
Wyoming Supreme Court has ruled that the Wyoming statute requires the
Department of Health to automatically issue a religious exemption once it
is requested and that no further inquiry by the Department is permissible.38
In contrast, a New York District court found that a parent's request
must
demonstrate [] that the espoused beliefs are sincerely held and that
the stated beliefs, even if accurately reflecting plaintiffs' ultimate
conclusions about the advisability of inoculation of their children, do
in fact stem from religious convictions and have not merely been
framed in terms of religious belief so as to gain the legal remedy de-
39sired.
However, although the religious belief must be sincerely held, the
board is not permitted to pass judgment on the beliefs of the purported re-
ligion.4 0 In Turner v. Liverpool Central School, the district court upheld a
religious exemption for a woman who was a member of the Congregation
of Universal Wisdom, a mail-order religion that did not require adherence
to any religious tenants.4 1 In other words, a state cannot question validity
of a particular religion; it may only scrutinize validity of belief in that re-
36 Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, Vaccine Exemptions, http://www.vaccinesafety
.edu/cc-exem.htm (last visited Nov. 19, 2009).
37 Julie E. Gendel, Playing Games with Girls' Health: Why it is too Soon to Mandate the HPV Vaccine for
Pre-teen Girls as a Prerequisite to School Entry, 39 SETON HALL L. REv. 265, 281 (2009).
38 In re LePage, 18 P.3d 1177, 1179 (Wyo. 2001).
39 Sherr v. Northport-East Northport Union Free Sch. Dist., 672 F. Supp. 81, 94 (E.D.N.Y. 1987).
40 Turner v. Liverpool Central School, 186 F. Supp. 2d 187, 193 (E.D.N.Y. 1987).
41 Id
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ligion.
Although the majority of states currently provide religious exemp-
tions, nothing within the bounds of the federal constitution requires them
to do so. 42 In the wake of a serious outbreak, there is no reason to believe
that a statute such as the one in Jacobson v. Massachusetts would not be
upheld and that millions would be vaccinated over religious objections.
Even if an outbreak does not occur, case law suggests that mandatory vac-
cinations would still be upheld.43
For better or worse, the United States is made up of a relatively de-
vout population. A 2007 survey by the Pew Forum found only 16.1 per-
cent of American adults reported being "unaffiliated" with any religion.44
However, 5.8 percent of that segment claimed to believe religion was im-
portant in their lives, but they were not affiliated with any specific religion
or church. 4 5 This means that roughly ninety percent of American adults
believe that religion plays a role in their lives. However, this does not
mean that ninety percent of American adults also religiously oppose vac-
cinations. Courts have held that states are not required to provide religious
exemptions.4 6 On the other hand, courts have not found that states are
barred from allowing religious exemptions if they choose to do so. Parties
seeking to strike down religious exemptions may do so under the Estab-
lishment Clause or the Equal Protection Clause.47
a. Challenges to Religious Exemptions
Based on the Establishment Clause
The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution reads, "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof."4 8 The first half of this is known as the Establish-
ment Clause. Laws do not usually run afoul of the Establishment Clause if
they do not favor a single religion over any other.4 9 In Lemon v. Kurtz-
man, the Supreme Court pieced together a three-part test based upon its
42 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. at 166-67 (1944); McCarthy v. Boozman, 212 F. Supp. 2d 945, 948
(W.D. Ark. 2002).
43 Boone v. Boozman, 217 F. Supp. 2d 938, 954 (E.D. Ark. 2002) (stating "[t]he Supreme Court did not
limit its holding in Jacobson to diseases presenting a clear and present danger.").
44 The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, U.S. Religious Landscape Survey, http://religions.pew
forum.org/reports (last visited Nov. 19, 2009).
45 Id.
46 McCarthy, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 948.
47 Linda LeFever, Comment, Religious Exemptions from School Immunization: A Sincere Belief or a Legal
Loophole?, 110 PENN. ST. L. REv. 1047, 1061-64 (2006).
48 U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl.I.
49 Walz v. Tax Com. Of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 676-77 (1970).
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earlier precedent to analyze whether a statute violates the Establishment
Clause.50 The Lemon test requires (1) that the statute have a secular legis-
lative purpose; (2) that its principal or primary effect must be one that nei-
ther advances nor inhibits religion; and (3) that the statute must not foster
- 51an excessive government entanglement with religion.
In Sherr v. Northport-East Northport Union Free School District, a
New York statute required every child in New York State to be immunized
against polio, mumps, measles, diphtheria and rubella.52 However, the law
included a religious exemption to the mandatory vaccinations. The ex-
emption provided that required vaccinations would "not apply to children
whose parent, parents, or guardians are bona fide members of a recognized
religious organization whose teachings are contrary to the practices herein
required."5 The Court held that the exemption contained in the New York
statute was a "blatant" violation of the Establishment Clause.54 Applying
the Lemon test, the Court found that the New York statute violated two
prongs of that test. According to the Court, the statute worked to inhibit
the religious practices of individuals who were not members of a state-
recognized religion. 5 The statute also caused the government to involve
itself too deeply into questions of religious belief, in violation of the
Lemon test.56
States seeking to eliminate religious exemptions in the wake of a bio-
logical attack may seek to rely on the Establishment Clause. The reason-
ing of Sherr could be extended to strike down exemptions that are not as
limiting as those in Sherr. Allowing religious exemptions necessarily ad-
vances religion by giving those who adhere to a religion priority status
over the community's collective health. Religious exemptions also neces-
sarily entangle governments in questions of religious dogma by attempting
to decipher which religious beliefs are sincerely held and therefore merit
an exemption. Even the decision whether the belief is religiously held, or
rather just a moral or philosophical opposition brings the government and
courts "exceedingly close to the involvement with ecclesiastical matters
against which the First Amendment carefully guards."57
50 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
51 Id. at 612-13.
52 672 F. Supp. at 84.
53 Id.
54 Id. at 89.
55 Id.
56 Id. at 90.
57 Id. at 92.
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b. Challenges to Religious Exemptions
Based on the Equal Protection Clause
Religious exemptions can also be fought on the basis of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. That Amendment pro-
hibits any state from denying "to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws." 8 In Brown v. Stone, the Mississippi Su-
preme Court found that religious exemptions could not be justified under
the Equal Protection Clause.59 The plaintiff in Brown sought admission of
his son to public school without complying with the mandatory inocula-
tions required for public school attendance. The Mississippi statute in-
cluded a similar exemption to the one in the Sherr case. It provided:
A certificate of religious exemption may be offered on behalf of a
child by an officer of a church of a recognized denomination. This
certificate shall certify that parents or guardians of the child are bona
fide members of a recognized denomination whose religious teach-
ings require reliance on prayer or spiritual means of healing.60
Brown attempted to supply a certificate of exemption from his local
Church of Christ. However, the certificate stated only the Brown had
strong convictions against the use of immunization, not that the church
taught opposition to immunization.6 1 Brown challenged the exemption
under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.
The Court went further than the opinion in Sherr and jettisoned the
entire religious exemption from the statute. The Court found that the stat-
ute requiring immunization "serves an overriding and compelling public
interest." 62 Further, the Court found that religious exemptions unfairly fa-
vor those children whose parents' religious beliefs oppose immunizations
to the detriment of the larger majority of children whose parents hold no
such beliefs. The Court found this imbalance to be in violation of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in that "it would
require the great body of school children to be vaccinated and at the same
time expose them to the hazard of associating in school with children ex-
empted under the religious exemption who had not been immunized as re-
quired by the statute."63
58 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
59 378 So. 2d 218 (Miss. 1979).
60 Id. at 219.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 222.
63 Id. at 223.
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1. Post-Attack Religious Exemptions
Religious exemptions indisputably endanger the community in which
the exemptions are granted. As the Court stated in Prince, a person "can-
not claim freedom from compulsory vaccination for the child more than
for himself on religious grounds. The right to practice religion freely does
not include liberty to expose the community or the child to communicable
disease or the latter to ill health or death."64 In the event of a biological
attack, politicians must do what is best for the population, not for their
own re-election concerns. The theory of herd immunity posits that once a
critical mass of individuals within a community is vaccinated, the disease
is unable to take hold and therefore vulnerable members of the community
are protected. 5
To ensure public safety in the wake of an attack, religious exemptions
must necessarily be eliminated. Authorities will have little time for pro-
tracted legal debates about the necessity to initiate mandatory vaccina-
tions; therefore, a mechanism should already be in place to eliminate reli-
gious exemptions in the event of a declared biological emergency.66
Legislation similar to the PREP Act, which would allow the Secretary of
Health and Human Services to issue a declaration under which all previous
vaccination exemptions are recalled for evaluation, would go a long way
in ensuring immunization levels that protect herd immunity.67
The Johns Hopkins Center for Law and the Public Health Institute for
Vaccine Safety has proposed draft exemption legislation for use by states
in defining exemptions to mandatory vaccination programs.6 8 Under the
Draft Exemption statute, exemptions based on the personal beliefs of the
parent would be recognized. Individuals must be granted a Certificate of
Exemption from Immunization issued by the public health department.
However, in order to obtain a Certificate, the parents must explain their
beliefs to the Department of Health personnel issuing the certificate and
must show that they understand the risks of non-vaccination, including the
need to remove the child from school should a communicable disease for
which the child is not inoculated appear in the school. 69 Additionally, the
64 Prince, 321 U.S. at 166- 167.
65 Geoffrey P. Garnett, Role of Herd Immunity in Determining the Effect of Vaccines against Sexually
Transmitted Diseases, 191 J. Infectious Diseases S97 (2005).
66 BARRY KELLMAN, BIOVIOLENCE: PREVENTING BIOLOGICAL TERROR AND CRIME 181 (2007).
67 Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness (PREP) Act, http://www.hhs.gov/disasters/discussion/
planners/prepact/index.html
68 for Vaccine Safety, Draft Exemption, http://www.vaccinesafety.edu/DraftExemption.htm (last visited
Feb. 1, 2010).
69 Id.
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Department of Health could deny the application for a certificate on the
grounds that it must protect the child's or the public's health after consid-
ering the risk factors of a given disease. 70 The certificate of exemption
would expire every twelve months, requiring a renewal of exemption.7 1
The Brown opinion rather straightforwardly presents a valid Equal
Protection Clause argument on which other states may rely in eliminating
religious exemptions to their mandatory vaccination requirements. The
reasoning that the Brown Court applied has not changed. Children of non-
religious parents still disproportionately carry the burden of preventing in-
fectious disease, and children with medical ailments disproportionately
carry the risk of contracting a potentially fatal disease. This risk is even
more pronounced in a post-attack environment.
2. Pre-Attack Medical Exemptions
One area where states seem to agree is in regards to medical exemp-
tions. All states allow for some form of medical exemptions. Children
who are allergic to vaccines, have compromised immune systems, or
would otherwise suffer more harm than good from receiving a vaccine are
commonly granted exemptions from mandatory vaccines. One of the pur-
poses of mass immunizations is to protect those individuals who cannot be
vaccinated.72 The statute at issue in Jacobson also provided for medical
exemptions for children, and the Court chose to read into the statute a pos-
sibility for adult medical exemptions, as well.73
Under the John Hopkins Center for Law and the Public Health Insti-
tute for Vaccine Safety draft exemption legislation, medical exemptions
would be recognized. 74 However, even those claiming a medical exemp-
tion must receive a Certificate of Exemption from Immunization issued by
the public health department. Even for a medical exemption, the Depart-
ment of Health could deny the application for a certificate on the basis of
the need to protect the child's or the public's health after considering the
risk factors of a given disease.75 The certificate of exemption would ex-
pire every twelve months, requiring a renewal of exemption, just as it
would for a religious exemption.76
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Geoffrey P. Garnett, Role of Herd Immunity in Determining the Effect of Vaccines against Sexually
Transmitted Diseases, 191 J. Infectious Diseases S97 (2005).
73 Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 39.
74 Institute for Vaccine Safety, supra note 68.
75 Id.
76 Id-
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A re-evaluation of medical conditions is a good idea considering the
changes in medical technology that affect vaccines, as well as underlying
medical conditions which make vaccines unsafe for certain ailments or
situations. If the vaccine formula changed, for example, it could allow for
a previously excluded medical condition to no longer be adverse to the
vaccination. Advances in medicine could also create cures or treatments
for medical conditions, which would make them less susceptible to vac-
cine complications. Therefore, a periodic reassessment of medical exemp-
tions would be the best way to approach medical exemption certification.
3. Post -Attack Exemptions
If the above biological attack were to happen in the United States, a
massive effort to vaccinate individuals from smallpox should begin. Ex-
emptions following a biological attack should be limited to the most criti-
cal medically necessary exemptions. The effort to vaccinate the U.S.
population should be more aggressive than that which occurred in the
years leading up to the eradication of the disease. Now, as then, the first to
be vaccinated would be medical personnel, first responders, and those in-
dividuals who had individual contact with the infected population.77
Although many Americans may have been vaccinated in the past, the
relative effectiveness of that vaccination will be only three to five years.78
This means that anyone not vaccinated within the last five years would
need to be revaccinated. There are currently more than 307 million people
residing in the U.S. 79 The vaccine should reach essential personnel and
exposed individuals first. While the U.S. government has a purported vac-
cine stockpile large enough for the entire U.S. population, vaccinating this
many people, or even a large percentage of this population, is going to
take time.80
States have the authority under the police power to require vaccina-
tions, and as already discussed, the Supreme Court has upheld those laws
as constitutional. As the Supreme Court noted in the Jacobson case, "Real
liberty for all could not exist under the operation of a principle which rec-
ognizes the right of each individual person to use his own, whether in re-
spect of his person or his property, regardless of the injury that may be
77 Center for Disease Control and Prevention, Smallpox Response Plan and Guidelines,
http://www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/smallpox/response-plan/index.asp (last visited Feb. 1, 2010).
78 Center for Disease Control and Prevention, Vaccine Overview, http://www.bt.cde.gov/agent/small
pox/vaccination/facts.asp (last visited Feb. 1, 2010).
79 U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. & World Population Clocks, http://www.census.gov/main/www/popclock
.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2010).
80 Center for Disease Control and Prevention, supra note 78..
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done to others."s' In the Jacobson decision, the Court pointed to the rea-
sonableness of the vaccination ordinance given the conditions in Cam-
bridge at the time the ordinance was passed.82 The court noted that small-
pox was "prevalent to some extent in the city" and that occurrences of the
disease were increasing.83 In the event of a bio-attack like that mentioned
above, the prevalence of the disease would be growing and exist in major
city centers.
At the time of the Jacobson decision, mobility was nowhere near the
rate it is today. In 1905, it may have been possible to stop the spread of
smallpox by mandating local vaccinations. However, it is hard to believe
that in today's world, a local ordinance vaccinating a single city popula-
tion would be enough to prevent the spread of a contagious disease like
smallpox. In 1905, Cambridge was the fourth most populous city in Mas-
sachusetts with 97,434 people.84 In 2008, Cambridge was still the fourth
most populous city in Massachusetts, with 105,596 people. However, the
rest of the country has outstripped the growth in Cambridge. In 2008, it
was estimated that there were 243 cities in the U.S. with larger popula-
tions.s Were the attack above to succeed in infecting populations within
major U.S. cities such as Chicago and New York, the possible number of
victims would be even larger. The speed at which the disease would travel
around the country and around the globe would be similar to that of the
2009 HINI flu, which had affected 206 countries as of November 2009.86
There is little doubt that the Supreme Court would uphold any similar
mandatory vaccination ordinances. However, the mandating of vaccines is
sure to be met with resistance by individuals much like Jacobson himself.
As biological science has matured and become more sophisticated, vac-
cines to even more childhood diseases come to the market. While small-
pox is a potentially deadly and terribly contagious disease, states have also
mandated vaccination as a condition to school attendance for disease such
as tetanus and Hepatitis B. Relying on Supreme Court precedent such as
Jacobson and Zucht, these requirements extend the Supreme Court's ra-
tionale to those diseases, which pose a smaller public health threat, but
nevertheless pose a threat to individual health.
81 Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 26.
82 Id. at 27.
83 Id.
84 Edward M. Hartwell, Federal Census Reports: Statistics of Cities, 1905, 11 PUBLICATIONS OF THE AM.
STAT. ASS'N 195,208 (1908).
85 U.S. Census Bureau, Population Estimates, http://www.census.gov/popest/cities/SUB-EST2008.html
(last visited Nov. 19, 2009).
86 World Health Org., Pandemic (HINI) 2009 - Update 75, http://www.who.int/csr/don/2009 11 20a/en/
index.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2009).
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The economic realities of unvaccinated populations affect the area of
lost wages for parents who are forced to stay home with their sick but non-
contagious children; this is another consideration in requiring vaccinations
even if the spread of the disease does not seem as prevalent as feared. A
terrorist attack involving a biological pathogen is likely to shake the econ-
omy in as yet unforeseen ways. A population susceptible to infection
would only worsen the economic downturn that is sure to follow.
The court in Jacobson left open the possibility that a court would in-
terfere if a state passed a public health regulation that was "so arbitrary
and oppressive in particular cases, as to justify the interference of the
courts to prevent wrong and oppression. However, in the wake of a
biological attack, it is unlikely that any mandatory vaccination program
against smallpox will be considered anything but necessary.
Medical exemptions may still be necessary, but those individuals
granted an exception should submit to a screening and certification proc-
ess. If the threat of the spread of the disease continues to last past a pro-
scribed length of time, such as a year, the medically exempt individually
should be required to apply for recertification. Both the initial and recerti-
fication process should take place in person with medical officials; in this
way, the sincerity of the medical claim can be evaluated and a professional
opinion rendered.
PART II - GOVERNMENT RESPONSES
TO BIOLOGICAL EMERGENCIES
Today, safeguarding the public health is largely the realm of state
governments, who are given guidance and support from a web of federal
agencies. Following a biological terrorist attack, the governmental re-
sponse to medical and biological needs of infected and not-yet-infected
populations will necessarily involve the federal government as a lead actor
in the struggle against a deadly pathogen.
A. Pre-Attack Federal and State Tools
for Responding to a Biological Emergency
Today, issues of public health and safety fall largely under the pur-
view of state public health officials. How public health offices are de-
signed and function varies from state to state. The federal government
provides planning, support, and guidance to state officials, but it largely
leaves details to the states.
87 Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 38.
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The main agency of federal health planning and policy is the Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services (HHS). Falling under the organiza-
tional umbrella of HHS is the CDC and the National Institutes of Health
(NIH). The CDC serves as national epicenter for "developing and apply-
ing disease prevention and control, environmental health, and health pro-
motion and health education activities designed to improve the health of
the people of the United States."88 The CDC attempts to identify health is-
sues and concerns in order to develop ways to treat and prevent such is-
sues. CDC is also tasked with controlling the introduction and spread of
infectious diseases and provides guidance and assistance to other state and
international agencies in developing their own disease prevention strate-
gies.89 On the development side, the NIH is the key federal agency for
conducting and supporting medical research. NIH officials "investigate
ways to prevent disease as well as the causes, treatments, and cures for
common and rare diseases." 90 NIH is mostly concerned with research and
development, whereas the CDC focuses more on policy.
The current mechanism of state execution with federal oversight is
evidenced in the HHS response plans for pandemic influenza.91 While the
plan provides for an overall strategy for fighting a flu pandemic, it leaves
certain decisions in the hands of the states. The plan describes the federal
role in a pandemic as it relates to collaboration with state authorities.
Within the realm of state decision are those issues of purchase, distribu-
tion, and administration of vaccines. 92 The plan also leaves the priority of
vaccinations up to the individual states. States were given the opportunity
to review the plan and develop their own plans in conjunction.93
B. Post-Attack Federal Response
to a Biological Emergency
Since a biological attack like that detailed above will have a nation-
wide if not global effect, it is imperative that the response to the attack
likewise be nationwide in scope and authority. Therefore, in the event of a
declared emergency following a biological attack, federal law and author-
ity should usurp the traditional state police power in mandating vaccina-
88 Centers for Disease Control, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (Mission Statement),
http://www.cdc.gov/maso/pdf/COGHfs.pdf (last visited Dec. 11, 2009).
89 Id.
90 Nat'l Institutes of Health, The Nation's Medical Research Agency, http://www.nih.gov/about/NlHover-
view.html (last visited Dec. 11, 2009).
91 JANET HEINRICH, U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, INFECTIOUS DISEASE PREPAREDNESS:
FEDERAL CHALLENGES IN RESPONDING TO INFLUENZA OUTBREAKS, GAO-04-11 OOT, ii (Sept. 28, 2004).
92 Id.
93 Id. at 5.
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tions. While the states have historically had control over those issues af-
fecting the public health, federal power is necessary to ensure a speedy
and standard response to the crisis. The exercise of federal power in a tra-
ditional state area requires an understanding of both (1) what unique tools
the federal government has with which it can respond to an attack and (2)
how to use those tools following a biological terrorist attack.
1. Post-Attack Federal Tools
for Responding to a Biological Attack
Under the auspices of HHS, the CDC will most likely be the lead ac-
tor in any response to a biological attack. The CDC's regional entities
would play a critical role in coordinating a response to a biological attack
and positioning vaccines for distribution.
The federal government is already positioned through the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to respond to national emer-
gencies such as a biological attack. FEMA is tasked with disaster mitiga-
tion, preparedness, response and recovery planning. Parallels exist be-
tween FEMA's response to hazardous material incidents and probable
actions in the wake of a biological attack.
A response to biological terrorism may also involve issues of national
security and therefore require response from the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS). DHS' Weapons of Mass Destruction and Biodefense Of-
fice provides a bio-aerosol environmental monitoring system in many ma-
jor U.S. population centers.94 DHS also utilizes Project BioShield along
with the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services to identify medi-
cal countermeasures and prepare to respond to biological attacks. With the
weight of all these federal agencies prepared to respond in the advent of a
biological attack, their collective decisions and directives should take pri-
ority over any state authority.
The World Health Organization (WHO) has the authority to order
quarantine requirements in order to prevent a global spread of disease,
which will be mirrored by actions taken by the U.S. federal government. 95
The federal government can also take the lead in implementing and com-
municating WHO directives to regional and state authorities.
While the CDC handles the biological fallout of an attack, the Federal
Bureau of Investigation will head the criminal investigation into the attack.
The FBI is the lead investigative agency into all areas of counterterrorism,
94 DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND BIODEFENSE OFFICE,
http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/structure/ge_1205180907841.shtm (last visited Nov. 19, 2009).
95 KELLMAN, supra note 66, at 188.
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specifically investigations involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
In July 2006, the FBI consolidated all WMD investigations into a new
WMD Directorate (WMDD). The head of the Directorate is a former sci-
entist from Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico.96 The Di-
rectorate focuses not just on post-attack investigation, but also counter-
measures and preparedness. The FBI specifically utilizes InfraGard, an
information sharing partnership between the Bureau and the private sector
to take information and distill it into useful intelligence analysis.97 Infra-
Gard could prove a very useful tool following a biological terrorist attack
for identifying infection hot zones and concentrating law enforcement ef-
forts in areas likely to bear evidence or clues regarding the origination of
the disease.
Following a report to the FBI of something unusual, such as an indi-
vidual exhibiting symptoms of small pox, a WMD coordinator from one of
the fifty-six FBI field offices will begin constant communication with lo-
cal authorities to monitor the situation." Between calls with local authori-
ties, the local WMD coordinator will inform the WMDD headquarters
about the alert. WMDD will consult with WMD experts to gain insight
into the possible attack.99 The experts will participate in a conference call
with the field office to ensure constant updates and communication. The
experts then give advice as to what response scenarios would be appropri-
ate for the Bureau to follow. 00
The federal government's involvement in traditionally state police
power actions usually requires justification under the Commerce Clause of
the Constitution. While Commerce Clause jurisprudence has undergone
significant changes over the course of this nation's history, the basic un-
derstanding is that the federal government has the unfettered ability to pass
legislation regarding interstate commerce.'01 Stockpiles of smallpox vac-
cine are unlikely to be found solely within one state, and it is even more
unlikely that any response to a smallpox epidemic would not require some
amount of interstate commerce. Recent Supreme Court decisions require
only a jurisdictional nexus between the law being passed and the federal
96 FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, http://www.fbi.gov/hq/nsb/
wmd/wmd _home.htm (last visited Dec. 11, 2009).
97 InfraGard, About InfraGard, http://www.infragard.net/about.php?mn=1&sm=1-0 (last visited Dec. 11,
2009).
98 FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, WMD THREATS: How WE RESPOND, http://www.fbi.gov/page21
march07/wmd030507.htm (last visited Dec. 11, 2009).
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. I (1824).
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government's constitutional authority to pass such legislation. 02 There-
fore, legislation regarding distribution of smallpox vaccine in the event of
a declared national emergency need only contain a jurisdictional nexus to
the federal government's authority to regulate interstate commerce. This
can be done by referencing the transportation and distribution of the vac-
cine stockpiles, thereby making its delivery to a state contingent on that
state's acceptance of federal requirements of mandatory vaccinations.
2. Post-Attack use of Federal tools
Once the federal government has established its authority to mandate
vaccinations, it is necessary to ask how the federal government will ensure
that its directives are being carried out by the states that may resent federal
intrusion into this area of regulation. It is not likely that the federal gov-
ernment will have the necessary personnel to directly vaccinate large
populations of the United States; therefore, that job will necessarily fall to
the states. But how should the federal government ensure that federal
guidelines and requirements for vaccinations are being followed? The
federal government has many far-reaching tools to use in order to ensure
compliance.
First, the federal government can cut federally funded programs in
those states where immunizations are not being carried out according to
federal guidelines and regulations. This can be legislation that either links
the granting of federal dollars to health programs specifically or that links
the granting of federal dollars to general programs. While the federal gov-
ernment will likely have control over the vaccine itself, delaying the dis-
tribution of the vaccine to non-complying states would not further the fed-
eral goal of protecting the public health and is thus not a viable option.
Alternatively, a system similar to that set up under the No Child Left
Behind (NCLB) legislation could be incorporated regarding biological ter-
rorism preparedness. 103 In advance of a biological attack, specific mile-
stones could be set for state health agencies. States that fail to meet those
milestones would have an opportunity to take corrective action. Consis-
tently underperforming states would risk federal intervention into pro-
grams if deficiencies were not eliminated. Federal health funds could be
flexible, just as in the NCLB legislation. States would be permitted to use
the funds in whatever way they see fit.104 This should be done prior to any
102 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
103 U.S. Dep't of Education, NCLB Overview, http://www2.ed.gov/nclb/overview/intro/4pillars.html (last
visited Nov. 19, 2009).
104 U.S. Dep't of Education, More Local Freedom, http://www.ed.gov/ncIb/freedom/local/flexibility/
index.html#nclb (last visited Nov. 19, 2009).
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biological attack, since post-attack cooperation by states will inherently be
less flexible. The protection of the public health following a biological at-
tack is certainly no less serious than the concerns that led to the passing of
NCLB.
PART III - PRE AND POST-ATTACK
LIABILITY CONSIDERATIONS
As with any government interference in matters of health, there are
sure to be those individuals who resent the legislation and will try to avoid
complying with it. A biological attack also necessarily involves a substan-
tial cost in both government resources and in the effect on a national work-
force that is in one stage or another of being vaccinated against a deadly
pathogen. The effects of the above recommendations fall into two catego-
ries: (A) practical impact, including the pre-attack and post-attack uses of
quarantine, and (B) economic impact.
A. Practical Impact
Any biological attack that occurs in the next few years will find a cur-
rent U.S. population that has become more skeptical of vaccinations and
less willing to accept the assurances of doctors and governmental entities
that espouse the benefits of vaccinations.o A recent development in this
area is the belief that vaccines are somehow linked to the onset of autism
in children. Fervor in the belief of a connection is so extreme that immu-
nologists have received death threats for their support of vaccine safety
and childhood inoculations. 1 06 Ironically, since children are arguably the
most likely to be injured by any increase in non-immunized children, the
move to not vaccinate them puts them at an even higher risk of harm than
complications from vaccines. 107
Any issue that involves the safety of children is likely to be a light-
ning rod for debate. An essential step in mandating vaccines is to get ac-
curate information to the public often and early. Any delay will allow
quacks, hacks, pundits, and celebrities a chance to offer their own opinions
as fact, undermining any government effort at protecting the public health.
The Department of Health and Human Services in coordination with the
National Institutes of Health have tried to combat the barrage of misinfor-
105 Perri Klass, Fearing a Flu Vaccine, and Wanting More of It, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2009, at D5.
106 Claudia Kalb, Stomping Through a Medical Minefield: The Author of a New Book About Autism Says
Exactly What he Thinks About Vaccines and Other Hot Topics, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 3, 2008, at 62.
107 Daniel B. Rubin & Sophie Kasimow, The Problem of Vaccination Noncompliance: Public Health
Goals and the Limitations of Tort Law, 107 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 114, 115 (2009).
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mation regarding the flu on a specially dedicated website. 0 8 The CDC also
collaborated with the popular WebMD site to provide accurate and timely
flu information to the public.' 09 However, government information sys-
tems are subject to the political realities of the countries in which they are
located. While the U.S. has maintained a robust public information cam-
paign during the HINI outbreak, this can be contrasted with the slow Chi-
nese response to the 2002 SARS outbreak." 0
Providing prompt and accurate information to the public may also
prevent ill-advised practices such as the "Swine Flu" parties that appeared
in the wake of the 2009 HINI flu pandemic. According to the CDC,
'Swine flu parties' are gatherings during which people have close
contact with a person who has 2009 HIN1 flu in order to become in-
fected with the virus. The intent of these parties is for a person to
become infected with what for many people has been a mild disease,
in the hope of having natural immunity 2009 HIN1 fll virus that
might circulate later and can cause more severe disease. 1
The CDC discourages this practice and recommends that people stay
away from people infected with the disease. However, the topic would not
have been brought up if groups of individuals in the country were not par-
ticipating in such gatherings.
The Food and Drug Administration monitors fraudulent treatments
and products related to disease outbreak.112 Profiteers will try to capitalize
on the fear that a disease outbreak engenders. Considering the number of
fraudulent HINI products,1 3 which seek to capitalize on fear over the dis-
ease, the number of scams following a biological terrorist attack will likely
be exponentially larger. There are a number of laws of which these types
of scams can run afoul, including FDA regulations and common mail
fraud. The FDA monitors websites and attempts to alert consumers to
threats as soon as they are discovered.1 4 However, the FDA's resources
are not limitless, and consumers should approach any supposed quick fix
to an epidemic with caution. Once a website or product is added to the
108 Dep't of Health and Human Serv., Know What to do About the Flu, http://www.flu.gov/ (last visited
Nov. 19, 2009).
109 Richard Webster, CDC hooks up with WebMDforflu blog, plus HINI updates, HARTFORD COUNTY
EDUC. HEADLINES EXAMINER, Nov. 28, 2009, available at http://www.examiner.com/x-17574-Harford-
County-Education-Headlines-Examinery2009m I ld28-CDC-experts-hooking-up-with-WebMD-for-flu-
blog-plus-H I NI-updates.
I 10 KELLMAN, supra note 66, at 185.
Ill Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2009 HINI Flu ("Swine Flu ") and You,
http://www.cdc.gov/HINIflu/qa.htm (last visited Nov. 19, 2009).
112 U.S. Food and Drug Admin., Fraudulent 2009 HINI Influenza Products List, http://www.accessdata.
fda.gov/scripts/h nl flu/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2009).
113 Id.
114 Id.
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FDA's list of fraudulent products, it will remain on the list until contrary
evidence is presented to the FDA.'"5 Some products appearing on the list
are authorized treatments for other conditions but are not approved by the
FDA for treatment of the disease claimed by the fraudulent web site.116
The FDA is charged with taking regulatory action against such scams.
Given the resistance to immunizations, once vaccines are mandated,
how can the government ensure that individuals are inoculated? For
school-age children, this is readily answered by the current policy of man-
dating vaccinations for school attendance and daycare admittance. This
has been the case for both public and private schools at both the elemen-
tary and collegiate level. In some cases, vaccinations have been required
before a student can participate in interscholastic athletics."'
For adults it may not be as simple as rounding up entire cities and
making them stand in line. One possibility for states is to require a vacci-
nation certificate before allowing a driver's license renewal or vehicle reg-
istration renewal. States may also connect vaccinations to such things as
state aid payments such as welfare or food stamps. However, states should
be careful that such policies do not unduly burden only the poor popula-
tions of their communities. States could partner with employers to ensure
that employees are vaccinated as a contingency to being allowed to work.
Vaccination could be a condition on filing a tax return.
Federal governments can implement similar checks on vaccination at
the federal level if necessary. Under the authority of the Federal Aviation
Administration and the Transportation Security Administration, individu-
als would not be able to fly on commercial airplanes without a certificate
of vaccination. Customs and Border officials could close the borders to
anyone not vaccinated. While this is considered a drastic measure and was
rejected during the beginning of the 2009 H1N1 outbreak, a biological at-
tack of smallpox necessarily requires even more vigilance. A decision to
immunize the entire population of the United States is a drastic step in it-
self and will have little practical effect if other individuals can enter or exit
the United States without abiding by the same vaccination guidelines.
None of these policies is assured of reaching each and every individ-
ual in the country; each, in turn, has gaps that may or may not be filled by
another policy. However, just as empirical evidence suggests that even a
slight scrutiny of a requested religious exemption for vaccinations resulted
in a significant decrease in those actually receiving an exemption, admin-
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 Calandra v. State College Area School Dist., 99 Pa. Commw. 223 (1986).
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istrative red tape that would surround obtaining government services with-
out a certificate of vaccination may promote vaccinations.' 18 All these
policies will also demonstrate the seriousness of the government regarding
the importance of the vaccine.
The Federal government should consider a plan of action prior to any
biological attack. Any plan discussed and developed ahead of a biological
attack will have better public reception than ad hoc reactions to a real and
worsening situation post-attack. Taking steps to settle mandatory vaccine
issues would be an important step in any preparation. While significant
government resources should be aimed at preventing a biological attack to
begin with, the government cannot stand by after an attack occurs and ex-
pect the public to be mollified by the effort put into prevention. If nothing
is being done to respond to an attack, none of the prevention steps will
matter at all to a community suffering the after-effects without relief.
Considering the criticism already leveled at the White House's level of
preparation for a biological attack, the government should ensure that both
its prevention and response plans are as thorough and comprehensive as
possible.' 19
1. Pre-Attack Quarantine law
In general, states are permitted under their police powers to prevent
the spread of dangerous infectious diseases.120 At one time or another,
every state in the United States has used the police power to enforce quar-
antine. 121 At one time the federal government also tried to exercise its
power to quarantine, but state quarantine regulation has largely usurped
this.122 However, the power to effect quarantine is not limitless. Courts
will only uphold those regulations they find to be reasonable. 123 Under the
police power, a state's department of health has the power to "isolate per-
sons who are throwing off disease germs and thereby endangering the pub-
lic health." 24 The purpose of the isolation is to prevent the spread of dis-
ease to other individuals, not to quarantine a number of individuals within
118 Ciolli, supra note 32, at 295.
119 Mimi Hall, Report: White House neglecting bioterrorism, USA TODAY, Oct. 22, 2009, available at
http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2009-10-21-WMD-threatN.htm?POE=click-refer.
120 Jew Ho v. Williamson, 103 F. 10 (3d Cir. 1900); People ex rel Barmore v. Robertson, 134 N.E. 815
(1922); In re Smith, 40 N.E. 497 (1895).
121 Robertson, 134 N.E. at 817.
122 Erin M. Page, Symposium: The Fifth Plague: Balancing Individual Rights and Public Health Safety
During Quarantine: The U.S. and Canada, 38 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 517, 518 (2006/2007).
123 Jew Ho, 103 F. at 21.
124 Robertson, 134 N.E. at 819.
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a large area where they may infect each other at will. 125 General assump-
tions of exposure are not enough to subject an individual to quarantine. 126
Public health officials must point to specific facts that evidence the exis-
tence of danger in the actual infection of the individual or his exposure.127
In Jew Ho v. Williamson, public health officials quarantined twelve
square blocks of San Francisco in response to nine alleged deaths from
bubonic plague.128 In striking down the quarantine, the court noted that
while a court will "go to the greatest extent, and give the widest discretion,
in construing the regulations that may be adopted by the board of health,"
it would not uphold a regulation that is not reasonably related to its stated
purpose.129 The court reasoned that if the purpose of quarantine were to
isolate those individuals who had been infected to keep them from spread-
ing the disease, the regulation enacted by San Francisco officials would
have the opposite effect.130
In People ex rel. Barmore v. Robertson, a court upheld the quarantine
of a woman known to be a carrier of typhoid fever.131 The court noted that
quarantines are not uniform in nature, but subject to change with the indi-
vidual facts of each case.' 32 However, the court was cautious in allowing
quarantines in all cases, stating, "where danger of an epidemic actually ex-
ists, health and quarantine regulations will always be sustained by the
courts." 33 The court further explained, "Health authorities cannot prom-
ulgate and enforce rules which merely have a tendency to prevent the
spread of contagious and infectious diseases, which are not founded upon
an existing condition or upon a well-founded belief that a condition is
threatened which will endanger the public health." 34 Therefore, the au-
thority of public health officials to effect quarantine is not limitless and
cannot be based on speculation and conjecture, but should be designed to
be effective and endure for only as long as the threat to public safety is
imminent.
Perhaps the most analogous case to our scenario, In re Smith, in-
volved the quarantine of two deliverymen who refused vaccination for
125 Jew Ho, 103 F. at 21-22; Robertson, 134 N.E. at 819.
126 Smith, 40 N.E. at 499.
127 Id.
128 Jew Ho, 103 F. at 10.
129 Id. at 21.
130 Id. at 22.
131 Robertson, 134 N.E. at 815.
132 Id. at 820.
133 Id. at 819.
134 Id.
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smallpox.135 The two men had delivered such items as trunks, bedding,
furniture and other personal belongings to and from a heavily infected area
of Brooklyn, New York. The Court struck down a quarantine of the two
men despite the public health officials' concern regarding the men's expo-
sure. In holding that the city could not detain the men in quarantine, the
court stated "obviously, there must be an inspection of persons and things
and the resulting discovery, if they are not actually 'infected' with disease,
that they have been 'exposed' to it, and that the conditions actually exist
for a communication of contagion, in order to bring into operation the
power to isolate."l 36 The court further found that the city health commis-
sioner's position and power did not give him the right to quarantine an in-
dividual on the basis of his refusal to be vaccinated.13 7 The court called it
a rather "extraordinary declaration" to allow city health officials that
breadth of power.138
2. Post-Attack Quarantine considerations
Following a major biological terrorist attack, those assertions consid-
ered extraordinary in Smith may be warranted. Depending on the size of
the infected population, health authorities may have to quarantine in their
homes people who refuse to be vaccinated without any evidence of their
being exposed to smallpox, at least until it can be ascertained that the indi-
vidual is not infected. During the first few days following the attack,
health officials will still be uncertain of the size of the attack, and the FBI
may not yet know if the attacker has expended his entire stockpile of
pathogen. While enforcing a quarantine is traditionally a state concern,
the U.S. federal government has enforced a quarantine when there is "an
'imminent threat to national security.""
39
Once the massive immunization effort begins, those who still refuse
to be vaccinated may have to decide between receiving the vaccine and
facing quarantine. Quarantines should be used sparingly, as they stress al-
ready burdened medical facilities during an outbreak and present addi-
tional problems of finding locations to house those with no immunity to
the current health crisis. For this reason, quarantines should also include
the smallest number of individuals possible. As the court pointed out in
135 Smith, 40 N.E. at 497.
136 Id. at 499.
137 Id. at 498.
138 Id.
139 Page, supra note 123, at 528 (quoting Victoria Sutton, Bioterrorism Preparation and Response Legis-
lation -- The Struggle to Protect States' Sovereignty While Preserving National Security, 6 GEO. PUBLIC
POL'Y REv. 93, 97 (2001))
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Jew Ho, a quarantine that encompasses large swaths of territory is not
likely to be effected, as those individuals will continue to interact and pass
the contagion among themselves in an enclosed environment.140
Quarantines in response to vaccination refusal would not be preemp-
tive but rather the result of a specific choice of an individual to not be im-
munized against smallpox, at least until it can be determined if the indi-
vidual has been exposed to smallpox. If it is known that the individual
refusing vaccination has had contact with an infected individual, then soli-
tary quarantine would be authorized even under pre-attack considerations.
If the individual has not been exposed to the disease, she can placed into a
group quarantine with other community members who have refused the
vaccine to protect this vulnerable group from infection until the rest of the
community is sufficiently vaccinated as to protect this group.
Any quarantine also necessarily involves some measure of security,
as some people will try to defeat the quarantine. 14 1 Therefore, the security
associated with the quarantine should be responsible to an authority sub-
ject to a command structure and working knowledge of the use of force
spectrum available to ensure compliance with the quarantine.142 In mod-
em parlance, quarantines are referred to as "isolation precautions" in co-
operation with "infection control." 43 The WHO has issued International
Health Regulations authorizing the WHO to initiate quarantines of people
and goods if they are suspected of infection.14 4 The federal government,
moreso than the individual states, has the money and the manpower to af-
fect a successful quarantine initiative. However, the federal government's
power is limited in the realm of quarantine, so it should either be expanded
by new legislation, such as the PREP Act, or expanded under existing leg-
islation.145 However, again, quarantines should be used sparingly and only
if no other measure is possible due to the cost and intrusiveness of quaran-
tine.
B. Economic Impact
Quarantines are not the only significant cost of a biological attack.
Responding to naturally occurring pandemics can be expensive. Respond-
140 Jew Ho, 103 F. at 22.
141 KELLMAN, supra note 66, at 186.
142 Id. at 187.
143 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Guideline for Isolation Precautions: Preventing Trans-
mission of Infectious Agents in Healthcare Settings 2007, http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dhqp/gl
isolation.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2009).
144 KELLMAN, supra note 66, at 189.
145 Page, supra note 123, at 528-32 (discussing various existing federal statutes and authority for authoriz-
ing federal quarantine).
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ing to a malicious attack may cost significantly more. The current battle
against the 2009 HINI flu strain has already taken an economic toll. In
June 2009, Congress appropriated $7.65 billion to fight the flu, which in-
cluded the HINI strain. 146 Of that amount, $6.12 billion has reportedly
been spent or set aside for vaccines and vaccine related materials.14 7 This
does not even include the costs estimated for the closings of schools and
the necessary corollary of parents missing work to be at home with sick
children. Should the HIN1 become more fatal and serious, the estimated
cost of fighting the virus will reach into the tens of billions. 148 The Com-
mission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction, a bipartisan
commission established by Congress in 2008 warned in a report to Con-
gress that an anthrax attack using a crop-duster could create an economic
impact to the tune of more than $1.8 trillion in cleanup and other addi-
tional costs. 149
Any consideration of expenditure must analyze the cost of mandating
a vaccine weighed against the cost of letting the virus run its course with
only voluntary vaccinations occurring. Clearly, a resurgence of the small-
pox virus after such an effort to eradicate the disease would go against a
century of public health policy. Taken in this light, not mandating vacci-
nations seems even more like a major policy mistake.
A serious question to be addressed is: who bears the costs of a violent
pandemic following a biological terrorism attack? An additional consid-
eration is that of tort liability, which involves two important aspects: (1)
responsibility of non-vaccinated individuals for the spread of disease, and
(2) responsibility of state and federal governments for side effects of man-
datory vaccines.
1. Responsibility of Non-Vaccinated Individuals
for the Spread of Disease
It will be difficult for governments to completely absorb the costs of
fighting an intentionally catalyzed pandemic. Those refusing vaccinations
without a medical exemption may be asked to bear a certain portion of the
economic burden. In the Jacobson case, the criminal fine assessed against
Jacobson was $5 for refusing to comply with the mandatory vaccina-
146 Chris Amico, How Much Will the HIN1 Flu Cost the U.S.?, PBS, Oct. 8, 2009, http://www.pbs.org/
newshour/updates/health/july-decO9/flu-costs_10-08.html.
147 Id.
148 Philippa Fletcher, HIN1 May Cost Economy Billions, REUTERS, Nov. 20, 2009, http://uk.reuters.com/
article/idUKTRE5AJ00V20091120.
149 Mimi Hall, Report: White House Neglecting Bioterrorism, USA TODAY, Oct. 22, 2009, available at
http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2009-10-21 -WMD-threatN.htm?POE=click-refer.
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tion.o5 0 The possibility of a fine may work to promote immunization, es-
pecially if the vaccination is free, but not getting a vaccination carries an
economic cost. In New York, the Board of Education has created a policy
requiring school principals to pay $2,000 for each day "an unvaccinated
child is in school." 5 1 This cost shifting makes the individual schools re-
sponsible and answerable to the presence of unvaccinated children in the
school.
As with any tort claim, a plaintiff must establish duty, breach, causa-
tion and damages. If a government were to mandate vaccinations for the
protection of the community, each person in that community would be un-
der a duty to receive a vaccination, unless medically exempted. The re-
quirement of vaccination also establishes the minimum required standard
in order to be in compliance with that duty. By refusing immunization, an
individual would automatically be in breach of his duty to the public
health of the community. The most difficult element to establish in the
event of a biological attack would be causation. While causation could be
established as to those who initiate the attack, it would be much more dif-
ficult to trace the source of the infection back to an individual who refused
vaccination. This would be especially true if that person was subject to
quarantine following his refusal. If the criminals are discovered, they may
be liable for damages caused by the disease, but it is unlikely a plaintiff
will gain much monetary satisfaction from an individual who commits a
biological attack.
Another option would be for those who elect not to be vaccinated to
pay into a fund established for disease monitoring or medical supplies.152
This method would negate the need for post-exposure proof of causation.
In Donovan v. Phillip Morris USA, Inc., a putative class of smokers
brought suit against a cigarette manufacturer. 153 At the time the suit was
filed, none of the class members were diagnosed with lung cancer or even
being treated by a physician for suspected lung cancer.' 54 The only dam-
ages sought by the class were payment for a medical surveillance program
that used advanced technology to screen the plaintiffs at an earlier state
than previously available. 55 The court noted that the class was asking for
"medical expenses reasonably to be incurred because of the alleged negli-
gence of Phillip Morris . . . These damages are indeed the only presently
150 Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 12.
151 Ciolli, supra note 32, at 294.
152 Rubin & Kasimow, supra note 108, at 117.
153 Donovan v. Philip Morris U.S.A., 914 N.E. 2d 891, 894-96 (2009).
154 Id. at 895.
155 Id. at 897.
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provable damages for the impact these plaintiffs have suffered as a result
of the alleged negligence of Phillip Morris."1 56 The Court found that if the
class could prove at least some sub-cellular changes that increased the
plaintiffs' risk of disease, along with the other elements of negligence on
the part of Phillip Morris, then it could recover damages in the amount
necessary for future medical monitoring. 157 The Court left open the possi-
bility that exposure to a toxin known to cause cancer could qualify for the
same damages.158
Following a biological attack, refusal to be vaccinated is an exactly
the type of harmful conduct left open in Donovan. Depending on the
prevalence of the disease, refusal to be vaccinated could be analogous to
an abnormally dangerous activity in tort law. An abnormally dangerous
(or ultra-hazardous) activity is one that cannot be mitigated or controlled
no matter how much care is exercised. An intentionally unvaccinated in-
dividual in the middle of a serious biological attack is a risk that cannot be
mitigated. The only mitigation available would be the vaccination of that
individual - the refusal of which is the cause of her dangerous condition.
The Second Restatement of Torts considers the following factors in decid-
ing if something amounts to an abnormally dangerous activity:
(a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person,
land or chattels of others; (b) likelihood that the harm that results
from it will be great; (c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise
of reasonable care; (d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of
common usage; (e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place
where it is carried on and; (f) extent to which its value to the com-
munity is outweighed by its dangerous attributes. 5 9
The last factor is clearly applicable in a non-vaccination scenario.
The value of a non-vaccinated individual to the community does not out-
weigh its dangerous attributes. The danger to the community comes from
the decision not to be vaccinated. In a minority of jurisdictions, foresee-
ability is added as a factor to deciding if an activity is abnormally danger-
ous.16 0  However, even were that to be applied in the case of non-
vaccinated individuals, there is little trouble in foreseeing the particular
harm caused by remaining non-vaccinated in the middle of a biological
terrorist attack. Abnormally dangerous activities carry with them a strict
liability standard. Therefore, any individual not vaccinated would be
strictly liable for the harm caused by her non-vaccination.
156 Id. at 900.
157 Id. at 901.
158 Id. (emphasis in original).
159 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (1977).
160 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 20 (2001).
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2. Responsibility of State and Federal Governments
for Side Effects of Mandatory Vaccines
State and federal governments should assume liability for the side ef-
fects of the vaccine as the U.S. did during the 1976-1977 Swine Flu Im-
munization Program. Given the compelling justification for immunizing a
population, it is important that the pharmaceutical companies are protected
from liability when the government mandates vaccinations.' 6' The gov-
ernment payouts following that Program were a small fraction of what has
already been paid to fight the 2009 HINI Flu, and a small fraction of the
estimated costs of not providing vaccinations at all. Liability should also
be limited to actual damages such as in the Support Antiterrorism by Fos-
tering Effective Technologies Act of 2002.162 Punitive damages in the
wake of a national emergency arising from a biological terrorism attack
would be inappropriate. Another option would be to enlarge the Smallpox
Vaccine Injury Compensation Program to include claims of those indi-
viduals inoculated following a bio-attack. This Program currently covers
only specific personnel.
Mandatory vaccination of first responders necessarily invokes the
question: to what extent is the government prepared to compensate a first
responder who submits to vaccination, only to suffer serious side effects.
Further down the chain of responsibility is the liability of the gov-
ernment to first responders in the event of a biological emergency. If the
government prepared for the emergency, then any claim of negligence on
the part of first responders would thus be weakened. However, if the gov-
ernment fails to plan, or plans poorly, then negligence may become an is-
sue. Illustrative of this issue are two lawsuits that arose from the 2003
SARS outbreak in Toronto, Canada. Both cases involve nurses who be-
came infected with the disease while working in a city hospital.163 The
suits alleged negligence on the part of the provincial government in re-
sponding to the SARS outbreak.
In 2005, Congress enacted the Public Readiness and Emergency Pre-
paredness Act (PREP Act).164 Under the PREP Act, the Secretary of HHS
issues a declaration that allows for immunity from tort liability for claims
"caused, arising out of, relating to, or resulting from" disease countermea-
161 KELLMAN, supra note 66, at 153.
162 Id. at 154.
163 Sharona Hoffman, Responders' Responsibility: Liability and Immunity in Public Health Emergencies,
96 GEO. L. J. 1913, 1927 (2008).
164 Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act, Pub. L. 109-148, div. C, 119 Stat. 2680, 2818-32
(2005).
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sures.165 If the Secretary determines that the threats and conditions consti-
tute a "present, or credible risk of a future public health emergency," then
the immunity from tort liability is granted to "entities and individuals in-
volved in the development, manufacture, testing, distribution, administra-
tion, and use of such countermeasures" unless the harm is caused by the
willful misconduct of those entities.166 Although a PREP Act declaration
may arise at the same time as a federally declared emergency, the PREP
Act declaration is not dependent on a declaration of national emergency
and may be issued in isolation from any other federal action.167
On October 10, 2008, the Secretary of HHS exercised this authority
and issued a declaration "to provide targeted liability protections for
smallpox countermeasures based on a credible risk that the threat of expo-
sure to variola virus, the causative agent of smallpox or other orthopoxvi-
rus and the resulting disease constitutes a public health emergency."168
The declaration remains in effect until December 31, 2015. The declara-
tion claimed a starting date of January 24, 2008, almost nine full months
before the declaration was even made. The PREP Act provides a crucial
tool in the federal government's arsenal to ensure the continued production
of critical vaccines and medication.
3. Criminal Responsibility
Of course, those individuals responsible for carrying out the smallpox
attack can be held criminally liable for the results of their crime. What
would be the responsibility of those individuals who refused vaccination?
What if a parent refused vaccination of her child, and before the state can
force a vaccination, the child falls ill and eventually died of smallpox in-
fection? Under those circumstances, could the parent be held criminally
liable under a theory of involuntary manslaughter resulting from the par-
ent's negligence? These are all questions that communities will have to
answer following a biological attack, and the answers will not always
come easily. First, considering the confusion and chaos following a terror-
ist attack, it will take some time before law enforcement can adequately
respond to accusations of negligently caused deaths of children. Second,
if a parent has refused vaccination for her child, then she probably refused
vaccination for herself. If a child falls ill with the disease, it is even more
165 U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV.'S, Public Readiness and Emergency Prepardness (PREP) Act,
http://www.hhs.gov/disasters/discussion/planners/prepact/index.html.
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 Declaration Under the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act, 73 Fed. Reg. 61,869 (Oct.
17, 2008).
2010] 3 1
DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW
likely the parent has likewise been ill. A government authority may not
want to spend resources prosecuting smallpox victims for the deaths of
their children.
CONCLUSION
There remains little question that in the wake of a major biological at-
tack using smallpox, the United States has the means to provide vaccina-
tion for every individual in the country who would not be medically ex-
empted. It is also evident that any requirement mandating smallpox
vaccinations during this time will be upheld under Jacobson and Zucht.169
In addition, under these Supreme Court decisions, any repeal of religious
exemptions to vaccinations will be likewise upheld. After a biological at-
tack, religious exemptions are an accommodation that the public health
can no longer afford. The federal government stands better prepared to
tackle the significant challenges and needs of a country reeling from a ter-
rorist attack; it will require assistance from the states to implement vacci-
nation regulations and to ensure that individuals are being vaccinated
against smallpox. However, the federal government should take the lead
in coordinating and planning any response to ensure standards are met, and
to ensure that all individuals in the United States have a clear picture of the
situation as it develops. Communication should come from quickly from a
central office, with an authority only the federal government can supply.
Governments need to prepare for the inevitable results of such poli-
cies; they should be prepared to deal with non-complying individuals who,
regardless of the consequences, insist on remaining unvaccinated. Gov-
ernments should also set up a legal framework to deal with the side effects
of the smallpox vaccine that will affect a small portion of those immu-
nized. Vaccine producers should be protected from liability by either gov-
ernment indemnity or vaccine compensation programs. Any preparations
made in advance of a biological attack will save the government time and
money that would be far more significant if not considered until after the
attack has taken place and the catastrophic consequences are already un-
derway. The logic of the Prince case can be extended to the broader situa-
tion of a biological attack, and could read, "[People] may be free to be-
come martyrs themselves. But it does not follow they are free, in identical
circumstances, to make martyrs of their [neighbors]." 70 Mandatory vac-
cinations protect people from their neighbors, even if they cannot protect
people from themselves.
169 Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 39; Zucht, 260 U.S. at 175.
170 Prince, 321 U.S. at 170.
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